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7.1 Introduction
By late 2005, U.S. net trade had been in deﬁcit for more than twenty-ﬁve
years and was on a trajectory for more than $700 billion for the year. In
dollar terms, this was the largest deﬁcit of any country ever; as a share of
gross domestic product (GDP), it was much larger than ever experienced
by a large industrial country. Pundits, policymakers, ﬁnanciers, and re-
searchers wanted to know how the trade deﬁcit got so large. They were
even more interested in its future path.
Empirical modeling of the determinants of trade ﬂows using the elastic-
ities approach has a very long history in international economics and is
used both to explain the past and to project the future. Key ingredients of
this model are the elasticity of demand for exports and imports with re-
spect to economic activity, the elasticity of exports and imports with re-
spect to relative prices, and the inﬂuence of other factors, for example,
global supply and increased product variety.
Given that so much work has already been done, has U.S. trade changed
so as to warrant more analysis in this vein? An examination of U.S. trade
patterns over the last twenty-ﬁve years ﬁnds that the commodity and coun-
try composition of trade have changed, particularly for imports. A chang-
ing country and commodity composition of trade may be particularly im-
portant to understand both the widening of the trade deﬁcit and its future
trajectory. Country composition may aﬀect comparative advantage as new
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Washington, DC.diﬀerences in exchange rate regimes across countries may aﬀect move-
ments of relative prices. Commodity composition may matter because of
diﬀerent products may have diﬀerences in relative price elasticities. In
addition, for both country and commodity composition, diﬀerences in
growth rates of diﬀerent categories of expenditure (particularly as reﬂected
in persistent and systematic deviation between production and absorption)
in the United States compared with that of U.S. trading partners could be
particularly important in explaining the dynamics of U.S. trade and the
deﬁcit.
This paper considers whether measures of economic activity other than
GDP better model observed trade ﬂows. It investigates whether income
and relative price elasticities of U.S. trade diﬀer by trading partner or com-
modity category. It asks whether new estimates of key parameters improve
the forecast performance of the trade equations. Our strategy creates a
database of bilateral trade data for thirty-one countries, aggregates these
detailed ﬂows into four categories of goods based on the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis’s (BEA) end-use classiﬁcation system—autos; industrial
supplies and materials, excluding energy (ISM-ex); consumer goods; and
capital goods. We employ trade prices and measures of expenditure that
match these four commodity categories and include a country-by-
commodity proxy for global supply-cum-variety.
We ﬁnd that using expenditure matched by commodity category is a su-
perior measure of economic activity compared with using GDP and yields
far more plausible values for the demand elasticities. We ﬁnd that the de-
mand and relative price elasticities diﬀer between industrial and develop-
ing countries and across the four commodity categories. Because the
commodity composition of trade and of trading partners has changed,
particularly for imports, we ﬁnd that the demand elasticity for imports is
not constant. We ﬁnd that industrial and developing countries have diﬀer-
ent demand and relative price elasticities for these four commodity cate-
gories. We ﬁnd that variety is an important variable for the behavior of cap-
ital goods trade.
Comparing the in-sample performance of our speciﬁcation—which dis-
aggregates by product group, uses matched expenditure and trade prices,
adds a variable for variety, and diﬀerentiates by trading partners’ level of
income into industrial and developing country groups—with that of the
standard formulation of the model—which uses aggregated trade data and
GDP as the expenditure variable—our disaggregated model predicts ex-
ports better in-sample but does not predict imports as well as the standard
formulation. Auto trade and consumer goods imports are least well ex-
plained in-sample by the disaggregated model; in-sample predictions of ex-
ports in each commodity category (consumer goods, autos, ISM-ex, capi-
tal goods) are superior than the predictions from the standard model.
The new elasticities yield insights into the sources of the widening of the
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approach to demand management and exchange rate regimes to rectify
global trade imbalances. With respect to demand management, these
newly estimated demand elasticities across commodity categories and
trading partners imply that if U.S. consumers saved more, this would be a
more important factor to change the trajectory of the trade deﬁcit than if
our trading partners grew more. With respect to exchange rate regimes, the
estimated relative price elasticities for industrial countries imply that the
dollar depreciation since 2002 should aﬀect trade with those countries, but
that signiﬁcantly greater exchange rate variation on the part of developing
countries as well is needed to appreciably narrow the U.S. trade deﬁcit.
Section 7.2 of the paper brieﬂy reviews the vast literature on modeling
U.S. international trade, focusing on the workhorse model of income and
relative prices, including its more recent variations that include proxies for
global supply and variety. Section 7.3 presents and discusses data on the
U.S. trade deﬁcit that show changes in country and commodity composi-
tion of trade, which initiated this investigation. Section 7.4 discusses our
newly constructed data. Section 7.5 presents the econometric approach.
Section 7.6 discusses results and summarizes ﬁndings. Section 7.7 presents
some implications and notes areas for further work.
7.2 Literature Review
The classic workhorse model for estimating trade elasticities has been
used since at least the 1940s (Adler 1945, 1946; Chang 1945–1946). It re-
lates the volume of exports or imports to real foreign and domestic income
and relative prices (in log form):
ln trade      1 ln income    2 ln rel.price.
The model assumes that domestic and foreign tradable goods are imperfect
substitutes, that price homogeneity holds (e.g., that an estimated coeﬃ-
cient on the trade price and domestic price are equal, thus allowing for a
single relative price term), and that the elasticities with respect to eco-
nomic activity (e.g., income) and relative prices are constant over time
(see Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez [2000] for a concise summary of the
model).
All studies ﬁnd—as expected—that an increase in domestic economic
activity (income) will raise the domestic demand for imports and that an
increase in foreign economic activity (income) will raise the foreign de-
mand for domestic exports. A rise in the relative price of imports to the do-
mestic substitute will reduce demand for imports, and a rise in the relative
price of a country’s export good to the foreign competing good will
dampen the demand for exports.
The sizes of the coeﬃcients on income and relative price vary greatly by
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and as to whether diﬀerent or additional explanatory variables are in the
model. Most studies estimate that the income elasticity for U.S. exports is
smaller than the income elasticity for U.S. imports and in this regard repli-
cate the earliest and most well-known ﬁnding by H. S. Houthakker and
Stephen Magee (1969). Subsequent studies often estimate higher export
and import elasticities than the original ﬁndings but surprisingly ﬁnd that
the ratioof the import to export elasticity varies relatively little from the 1.7
found by Houthakker and Magee.1
Despite the empirical persistence of this asymmetry and its concomitant
value for intermediate-term projections of U.S. trade ﬂows, it is not consis-
tent with global long-run equilibrium. The estimates imply that if the
United States and the rest of the world grow at the same pace (long-run
convergence), the U.S. trade deﬁcit would worsen, absent a trend change in
relative price2—which is also inconsistent with long-run equilibrium. Re-
searchers continue to investigate U.S. trade ﬂows and the Houthakker-
Magee asymmetry by examining diﬀerent data samples, considering more
precise measures for certain variables, employing diﬀerent estimation tech-
niques, and adding new independent variables to the basic Houthakker
and Magee speciﬁcation.
One approach to the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry is to evaluate
whether changes in the commodity composition of U.S. trade over the past
twenty-ﬁve years changes the elasticities. For example, researchers have
found diﬀerent income and price elasticities for diﬀerent product cate-
gories (see Stone [1979] and Marquez [2002] for diﬀerent goods categories;
see Sawyer and Sprinkle [1996] for a survey; see Deardorﬀ, Humans, Stern,
and Xiang [2001] and Mann [2004] for services). Hooper, Johnson, and
Marquez (2000) cannot reject the hypothesis that the U.S. trade elasticities
are constant over time, but they hold the country composition of trade
ﬁxed at the 1995 shares and, because of data availability and the objective
of the study, focus on industrial-country trade. On the other hand, using a
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1. Houthakker and Magee (1969) estimated the U.S. income elasticity for total imports of
1.7 (autocorrelation corrected estimate in the appendix) and the foreign income elasticity for
U.S. exports at around 1. In their survey of import and export demand elasticities for the
United States, Sawyer and Sprinkle (1996) ﬁnd income elasticities for total merchandise im-
ports ranging from 0.1322 (Welsch 1987) to 4.028 (Wilson and Takacs 1979). Estimates for
foreign income elasticities for U.S. exports do not vary quite as much; still they range from
0.374 (Stern, Baum, and Greene 1979) to 2.151 (Wilson and Takacs 1979). The median
(mean) estimate of the twenty-four studies on total U.S. imports referenced in Sawyer and
Sprinkle is 2.02 (2.14). The median (mean) estimate of the seventeen studies on total U.S. mer-
chandise exports referenced in Sawyer and Sprinkle is 1.12 (1.02). In one of the more recent
studies, Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000) ﬁnd that the long-run income elasticities for
U.S. exports and imports are 0.8 and 1.8, respectively, and are stable over time. See also dis-
cussion in Mann (1999, 123–26).
2. Krugman and Baldwin (1987), among others, make this observation and discuss impli-
cations.century of data, Marquez (1999) ﬁnds that the elasticity with respect to in-
come for U.S. imports varies over time as trade openness aﬀects the share
of imports in expenditure.
Researchers have also focused on “the notorious inadequacies of import
and export price indexes” (Houthakker and Magee 1969, 112). Relative
price measures used most often to proxy for domestic substitutes for the
traded product—the GDP deﬂator and the wholesale price index—intro-
duce bias because both include a considerable share of nontraded goods
(Goldstein and Khan 1985). Moreover, conventional price indexes for
traded goods are too aggregated to reﬂect new product introductions and
may not take account of the eﬀect of changes in global supply on prices and
therefore on demand, which apparently have been important features of
current data.3 Incorporating diﬀerent price indexes changes the estimated
income elasticities in the workhorse model. In a narrow investigation,
Feenstra’s (1994) detailed work on prices of six narrowly deﬁned manufac-
turing goods substantially reduced the estimated income elasticity of U.S.
import demand for these six products.4 Marquez (2002) constructs a rela-
tive price variable using Feenstra’s price-index methodology and also in-
cludes a type of relative capital stock term originally used in Helkie and
Hooper (1988); his estimation reduced income elasticities for U.S. imports
of producer goods, but not of services or consumer goods.
Constructing new price indexes is outside the scope of most empirical
work, so researchers have focused on putting auxiliary variables in the
standard regression to account for changes to supply and demand that may
not be incorporated into price indexes. The sign and size of any such
supply-cum-variety variables is not clear. If new trading countries simply
increase global supply, global prices would tend to fall and thus increase
demand for their exports. But according to Paul Krugman’s (1989) “45-
degree rule,”5 such fast-growing countries produce more varieties with in-
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3. Broda and Weinstein (2004) show that between 1972 and 2002 the number of varieties
imported by the United States increased by 252 percent (15), with an important source of the
new varieties being the entry into global trade of dynamic emerging-market economies in-
cluding China, Taiwan, Korea, India, and Mexico. Hummels and Klenow (2004) ﬁnd that as
countries industrialize and grow, not only do their exports increase in nominal value but also
the breadth of variety these countries oﬀer to the world widens. Schott (2004) shows that va-
rieties within a product set diﬀer systematically across countries, with higher unit-value vari-
eties coming from countries with higher productivity. See also Funke and Ruhwedel (2001).
4. Feenstra considers imports of men’s leather athletic shoes, men’s and boys’ cotton knit
shirts, stainless steel bars, carbon steel sheets, color television receivers, and portable type-
writers, and, for comparison purposes, gold and silver bullion between 1967 and 1987. He
treats as variety a good from a particular country (often termed the Armington assumption)
and calculates each variety’s share in actual U.S. expenditure and the U.S. elasticity of substi-
tution between those diﬀerent varieties. This method takes account of the new varieties pro-
duced (in this case, equivalently new trading partners) and exported in ever greater quantities
by developing countries, for example.
5. It is called the “45-degree rule” because the growth rates and the ratio of export to im-
port income elasticities for countries can be plotted as a 45-degree line between two axes.creasing returns to scale and should not experience a deterioration of their
trade balance (and therefore face steady depreciation of their currency) be-
cause consumers love varieties. Given income, the apparent demand curve
for the varieties shifts out, and there is no deterioration in the terms of
trade. Peter Schott (2004) ﬁnds that fast-growing countries with high pro-
ductivity growth produce varieties that are high unit value, so for them the
demand curve is not only shifting out but also tilting in their favor.
The classic workhorse model (of equation [1]) using the standard com-
plement of income and relative prices may not take account of the eﬀect
that trading partners’ supply or variety of exports have had on U.S. import
prices or import demand. The U.S. import elasticity would tend to be over-
estimated to the extent that some of the explanation for the rising share of
imports in U.S. GDP lies with increased foreign supply (and thus lower
prices and thus more demand for imports); and some of the explanation
comes from increased domestic taste for variety, holding income constant.
Researchers have implemented the global supply-cum-variety measure us-
ing several variables.
• Helkie and Hooper (1988) use the ratio of home to foreign productive
capital stocks to represent exporters’ increased capacity to supply
more new products to the U.S. market. Their new variable signiﬁcantly
reduced the inequality between income elasticities for U.S. imports
and exports for the time period of their estimation. But in later work
using more recent data, the variable is no longer econometrically sig-
niﬁcant.
• Bayoumi (1999) includes exporters’ GDP in a panel estimation for
trade ﬂows between 21 industrial countries. He ﬁnds that this supply
eﬀect is signiﬁcant and increases in the longer run;6 the importer’s es-
timated income elasticity decreases over time.
• Marquez (2002) considers immigration as a proxy for American con-
sumers’ tastes for varieties from abroad. With a growing share of im-
migrants in the population, he posits that U.S. demand for imports
from immigrants’ home countries must be higher, all other things
held equal. Including the immigration variable does reduce the esti-
mated U.S. income elasticities for services and consumer goods im-
ports.
• Gagnon, in three recent papers (2003a,b, 2004), ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
supply eﬀect (deﬁned as potential output growth or relative GDP of
the exporting country). Including this supply variable reduces the co-
eﬃcient on income in a U.S. import regression. His results for U.S. ex-
ports are less robust.
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6. The fact that the coeﬃcient on exporters’ output increases with increasing lags shows
that it is the exporting countries’ potential growth that determines its capacity to supply va-
riety, not short-run ﬂuctuations in growth rates.• Similarly, Cline (forthcoming) puts the trading-partner GDP into the
workhorse model and ﬁnds that it reduces the income elasticities in
U.S. trade equations for both exports and imports.
To summarize, considering changes in trading partners and commodity
composition of trade, using more disaggregated trade prices, and taking
better account of global supply or demand for variety are the predominant
directions of the research to date. We will continue in these directions and
also investigate the income variable itself, collecting data that better
matches this variable to the disaggregated commodity and country com-
position of trade. So there are ﬁve dimensions for our analysis: trading
partner, composition of trade, variety-cum-global supply, measures of eco-
nomic activity, and trade prices.
7.3 Graphical Evidence to Support a Disaggregated Approach
Figure 7.1 and table 7.1 display the commodity decomposition of U.S.
merchandise trade and are key spurs to this investigation.7 Figure 7.1
shows the U.S. trade deﬁcit disaggregated into the BEA’s end-use cate-
gories of capital goods, ISM-ex, consumer goods, and autos and auto
parts. (For completeness, the ﬁgure also shows net trade in “other”—pe-
troleum and agricultural products.) The bulk of the deterioration in the
trade deﬁcit can be accounted for by a widening deﬁcit in autos, consumer
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7. Detailed presentation of all the data is available in the appendix ﬁgures in Mann and
Plück (2005).
Fig. 7.1 U.S. trade balance by principal end-use categories, billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Transactions Accounts Data.goods, and oil. Capital goods and ISM-ex appear to be more global pro-
cyclical.
Table 7.1 decomposes export and imports into these same commodity
groups. The largest categories of both imports and exports are capital
goods and ISM-ex; from 1980 to 2004, the share of capital goods rose and
that of ISM-ex fell. Capital goods is a particularly interesting category be-
cause of the potential importance of changing global supply and variety.
Moreover, from a macroeconomic perspective, global investment cycles
may diﬀer from global GDP cycles, with consequences for U.S. capital
goods exports and imports. Consumer goods is a large category with a
dramatic increase in the share of U.S. merchandise imports, rising from 14
to 25 percent in twenty-ﬁve years. The share of consumer goods in total
merchandise exports rose only modestly and accounts for only 13 percent
of exports. Consumer goods constitute a particularly interesting category
because of the potential role of changes in country source of supply.
Moreover, from a macroeconomic perspective, diﬀerential growth in per-
sonal consumption expenditures in the United States versus that in trad-
ing partners may be an important factor in the widening of the U.S. trade
deﬁcit.
Table 7.2shows that the country compositionof trade, particularly of im-
ports, has changed dramatically.8 Trade with the industrial countries in
general has stayed relatively stable, with the share of imports remaining at
about 50 percent and that of exports falling from 60 to 55 percent (1980 to
2004). Within the industrial-country group, exports to Europe and Japan
have fallen. The share of imports from certain developing countries and re-
gions has changed dramatically, with the share of imports from China in-
creasing from basically 0 to 13 percent over the period, the share of exports
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Table 7.1 Trade share by principal end-use category (%)
Imports Exports
1980 2004 1980 2004
ISM-ex 31 26 29 14
Capital goods 34 40 13 23
Consumer goods 8 13 14 25
Autos 8 11 11 15
Other 20 12 43 23
Memo: Trade as a share of GDP 10.7 15 9.4 9.8
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Transactions Account data, table 2.
Notes: ISM-ex   industrial supplies and materials, excluding oil. “Other” deﬁned as petro-
leum products and feeds, foods, and beverages.
8. Additional detail on these data can be found in appendix ﬁgures A2.1 and A2.2 in Mann
and Plück (2005).to Mexico doubling to 11 percent, and the share of trade with Latin Amer-
ica (less Mexico) contracting.
Putting the evidence on commodities and countries together with the evo-
lution of trade ﬂows and the trade deﬁcit suggests that closer inspection of
trade ﬂows by country andcommodity is warranted. However, the BEA does
not publish bilateral trade data by merchandise categories. The Census Bu-
reau’s published trade data by category and trade partner does not extend
back further than 1995, and the United States International Trade Commis-
sion (USITC) database covers bilateral trade by product only from 1989.
Hence, we turn to another comprehensive source of a long time series of data
to analyze the changing commodity-and-country composition of U.S. trade.
7.4 Our Database on U.S. Trade Commodity—By Country
Our empirical investigation of trade by commodity and country requires
a new database of disaggregated bilateral trade; it also requires additional
country and commodity-speciﬁc data. Our database includes (a) a thirty-
one-country sample of bilateral trade with the United States aggregated
into four commodity groups so as to replicate the BEA’s main end-use cat-
egories; (b) expenditure data matched by country and matched to the com-
modity groups; (c) trade prices matched to the commodity groups, and
relative prices matched by country and commodity group; and (d) a
supply-cum-variety proxy for each commodity group.
7.4.1 Constructing Bilateral Trade Data
To approximate our initial evidence derived using BEA data and be-
cause we use the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s (BLS) trade price indexes that
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Table 7.2 Trade shares by country/region (%)
Exports Imports
1980 2004 1980 2004
E u r o p e 3 22 31 92 2
Canada 19 24 17 18
Mexico 7 14 5 11
Japan 9 6 13 9
China 2 4 0 13
Asia without China and Japan 15 18 20 17
Latin America without Mexico 11 8 10 7
Australia 1211
Other 5 2 15 3
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Transactions Accounts Data.
Note: “Other” includes Africa and international organizations.are matched to the BEA categories, we recreate the BEA’s end-use cate-
gories using the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC, Revi-
sion two-, four-, and ﬁve-digit), which in the United Nations Comtrade
database spans the longest time period. To match BEA’s end-use commod-
ity groups, we use Comtrade’s raw materials and intermediate goods for
our “ISM-ex” category; “capital goods” encompasses most of SITC chap-
ter 7 and some categories in chapter 8; “autos” includes passenger vehicles
and their parts from chapter 7; and “consumer goods” is made up almost
entirely of the categories comprising chapter 8. We excluded all of chapter
3 (energy) and all of chapter 1 (food) as these are also excluded from the
BEA’s end-use categories that are the focus of our graphical evidence.
Table 7A.1 in the appendix shows the complete list.
For our econometric technique, we need a uniform panel with the same
set of countries for each of the commodity groups for both imports and ex-
ports. To select countries to include in the database, we start with bilateral
trade between the United States and partner countries by each four-digit
or ﬁve-digit SITC category. For each country reporting trade data to the
United Nations, we calculated its share in U.S. total merchandise imports
and total merchandise exports and its share in trade in each of our four
commodity groups. Of all countries in the database, we selected those that
represented the ﬁrst 90 percent of trade in each category. We excluded most
of the Middle East because of the suspicion that trade with these countries
might not be well estimated with the income and relative price formulation
of the standard workhorse model. We excluded the countries of the former
Soviet Union because there are insuﬃcient data on expenditure and prices.
We also excluded South Africa. Hence, our sample of bilateral trade pairs
includes thirty-one countries from Asia and the Paciﬁc, North America,
Latin America, and Western Europe.9
Because of our intended econometric approach, some variation in coun-
try composition across the commodity groups is ignored. For example,
Bangladesh, Honduras, and Sri Lanka are excluded; even though they are
in the ﬁrst 90 percent of U.S. imports of consumer goods, they were not im-
portant trading partners in the other end-use categories. At the other ex-
treme, we included thirty-one countries in U.S. auto imports and exports
even though the United States trades autos and parts overwhelmingly with
Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Germany.10
256 Catherine L. Mann and Katharina Plück
9. Trade data on thirty countries are from the United Nations’s (UN) Comtrade database.
Data on a comparable basis for Taiwan come from that country’s statistical oﬃce.
10. Our econometric estimates in this paper conﬁrm that the coeﬃcients diﬀer across the
commodity-and-country composition of trade. In a subsequent analysis, we will drop the re-
quirement to have a uniform panel and allow the country composition of the commodity
groups to vary. As noted later, this may improve the in-sample predication of imports of au-
tos and consumer goods.Figure 7.2 shows one example—imports of capital goods—of how sig-
niﬁcant is the change over time in the country-by-commodity shares.11
To employ the workhorse model of trade, we need real exports and real
imports. We deﬂate all nominal values by the corresponding end-use ex-
port and import price indexes from the BLS’s International Price Pro-
gram.12
7.4.2 Constructing Matched Expenditure Variables and Relative Prices
A key part of the analysis is whether the elasticities estimated in the work-
horse model diﬀer by the measure of economic activity employed. The stan-
dard measure of economic activity used in trade equations is real GDP. Al-
though this makes sense in aggregated trade equations, given the commodity
focus of this paper, superior elasticity estimates may be generated by better
matching the activity variable to the type of traded commodity.
We construct country-speciﬁc measures of real consumption expendi-
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Fig. 7.2 Regional or country shares of U.S. capital goods imports (percent)
Source: United Nations Comtrade database.
11. See appendix ﬁgures A4.1 to A4.8 in Mann and Plück (2005) for detailed presentation
of the country-by-commodity data over 1980 to 2003.
12. The end-use import and export prices do not diﬀerentiate by trading partner. Inspec-
tion of some country-speciﬁc time series data from the BLS rejects the assumption that prices
do not vary by trading partner. However, country-speciﬁc trade-price data are unavailable at
suﬃcient time series length and are not disaggregated on an end-use basis.ture, investment, and GDP from the Penn World Tables.13 On the import
side, U.S. real GDP, real consumption expenditure, and real investment are
all from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables. In the
estimation, we use real consumption expenditures in the trade equations
for consumer goods and autos and real investment expenditures in the
trade equations for ISM-ex and capital goods.14 Notably, real investment
growth is much more volatile than GDP, and real consumption growth and
real GDP growth diverge for extended numbers of years in the 1980s and
1990s.
There is another rationale for using a diﬀerent measure of economic ac-
tivity than GDP. The systematic deterioration of the U.S. current account
deﬁcit and the comparable rise in current account surpluses around the
world (as documented in Truman [2005] and Mann [2005]) suggest a sys-
tematic bias in GDP as a measure of economic activity. For chronic surplus
countries, GDP growth as a measure of activity generating demand for
U.S. exports may be too high as domestic demand growth is less than GDP
growth by the share of net exports in those countries’ GDPs. For the
chronic U.S. deﬁcit, GDP growth as a measure of activity generating de-
mand for U.S. imports may be too low as domestic demand growth is
greater than GDP growth by the share of net imports in U.S. GDP. A key
econometric exercise is to compare the estimated demand elasticities
across these alternative measures of economic activity, controlling for
country and commodity-speciﬁc eﬀects.
In our analysis, we take the relative price variable of the workhorse
model (trade price relative to domestic competing substitute) as given
rather than estimate a system of trade and price equations.15 We construct
relative prices for U.S. imports as the ratio of the end-use speciﬁc import
price index from the BLS and the corresponding U.S. domestic price index
from the BLS: The producer price index (PPI) is used for ISM-ex and cap-
ital goods. The consumer price index (CPI), excluding energy and food
prices, is used for consumer goods and autos. To construct relative export
prices, we converted the dollar-based end-use–speciﬁc export price index
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13. We generate real measures of expenditure by multiplying the real per capita values by
population. Because the Penn data only extend through 2000, we use the growth of these
expenditure categories from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) deﬂated by
domestic producer price or consumer price indexes to complete the time series to 2003. For a
discussion of purchasing power parity (PPP)–adjusted data versus market exchange rate–
adjusted data when undertaking comparative country analysis, see Castles and Henderson
(2005).
14. Appendix ﬁgure A3.1 in Mann and Plück (2005) shows the various export-weighted for-
eign activity variables and various U.S. activity variables.
15. Most recent studies estimate prices as part of a set of simultaneous equations (Hooper,
Johnson, and Marquez 2000). While researchers have always warned of the bias that may be
introduced by treating relative prices as exogenous, several recent studies could not conﬁrm
that the coeﬃcient on economic activity changed when including diﬀerent formulations of
this price variable or when allowing for simultaneity.from the BLS into foreign currency using current market exchange rates
and divided by the respective trading partner’s price index (using CPI or
PPI depending on the commodity group, as for the U.S. data).16 Notably,
over the twenty-three-year period, the relative price of capital goods ex-
ports and imports exhibit more variation than the relative price of all im-
ports and exports; the relative price of consumer goods imports shows rel-
atively less variation.
7.4.3 Constructing Variety
Recent literature has focused on adding variables to the workhorse
model, in part to address the issues, as previously discussed, that have not
been embodied in oﬃcial price indexes. A global supply variable could ac-
count for entry of dynamic emerging-market economies into global trade
and proxy for an outward shift of the global supply curve, which enables
the United States to buy more imports at lower prices. A variety variable
could account for diﬀerences in quality of goods within a commodity cat-
egory and how variety in imports (exports) available to U.S. consumers
(foreign buyers) has grown. Such quality or variety shifts and changes in
taste may not be incorporated into the price indexes we use, hence biasing
the overall regression.
Following Broda and Weinstein (2004) as well as Gagnon (2003b), we
construct a variety proxy by counting the number of SITC four-digit cate-
gories that are included in each commodity group for a given country in
each year. To compare the growth in variety across countries and cate-
gories, we set the number of categories equal to 100 in the ﬁrst year of our
panel. Similar to Broda and Weinstein, we ﬁnd that the growth in variety
was modest for the industrial countries; emerging-market economies on
the other hand substantially increased their supply of variety to the United
States.
The growth in variety was especially great for capital goods imports—
with the number of SITC categories provided by China having grown by
more than 250 percent.17In 1980, China provided only forty-six categories
under the capital goods heading, with “metalworking machine tools” be-
ing the biggest in nominal dollar terms ($18 million); in 2003, China sup-
plied 125 goods out of a possible 136 four-digit categories in capital goods,
with $9 billion worth of “peripheral automatic data processing units” as
the largest and $6 billion of “oﬃce-machine accessories” as the second-
largest category. Varieties from other developing countries have also risen:
capital goods variety from non-Japan Asia increased by 76 percent; vari-
eties in consumer goods from the Western Hemisphere and Asia increased
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16. See Mann and Plück (2005), appendix ﬁgures A3.2 and A3.3 for the movement of se-
lected relative price variables.
17. Broda and Weinstein’s (2004) ﬁndings are similar.by 39 and 30 percent, respectively. The United States’s supply to its diﬀer-
ent trading partners behaved similarly to that of other industrial countries:
Between 1980 and 2003, U.S. variety of exports in capital and consumer
goods grew, on average, by 10 percent.
7.5 Econometric Implementation
Our panel thus comprises import and export data, activity variables, and
relative prices for thirty-one U.S. partner countries, twenty-four years, and
four commodity groups (2,976 observations in all). Each commodity
group panel contains thirty-one time series of country data. The whole
panel consists of the four commodity panels stacked on top of each other.
We use a dynamic panel speciﬁcation to model bilateral trade ﬂows. Our
model allows us to estimate both short-term and long-term eﬀects of
changes in the explanatory variables—similar to an error correction model
(ECM) common in time-series estimations:
ln  tradeij,t    0    1  ln tradeij,t 1    2  ln activityij,t
   3  ln activityij,t 1    4  ln rel.priceij,t
   5  ln rel.priceij,t 1    6 ln tradeij,t 1    7 ln activityij,t 1
   8 ln rel.priceij,t 1    ij   uij,t,
where idenotes the ith trading partner, jdenotes the jth commodity group,
and t   1980–2003 are the years in our sample; the  ijs are the unobserved
ﬁxed eﬀects and the uij,t denotes the idiosyncratic error.
For the short-run eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on the diﬀerenced natural loga-
rithms of economic activity shows the short-run eﬀect of a 1 percent point
change in GDP, investment, or personal consumption expenditure on real
exports or imports.
For the long-run relationships, the coeﬃcients on the level logs divided
by the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable represent long-run
eﬀects; as in the long run, we can set the diﬀerenced terms equal to zero:
ln tradeij,t 1      ln activityij,t 1   ln rel.priceij,t 1
  ( ij   uij,t).
The calculated coeﬃcient on economic activity in this equation shows the
eﬀect of a 1 percent increase in GDP, investment, or personal consumption
expenditure on real trade ﬂows.
Using a dynamic formulation in a ﬁxed-eﬀects or ﬁrst-diﬀerence context
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260 Catherine L. Mann and Katharina Plückboth with the diﬀerences and the level of the lagged dependent variable,
thus biasing the results for the coeﬃcients. Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose an estimation method that instruments
the lagged levels of the dependent variable with the lagged diﬀerences of
this variable and the diﬀerences of the dependent variable with its lagged
levels. Our results using these instruments and technique were poor.
Wooldridge (2002, chapter 11) and Kennedy (2003, 313) discuss the chal-
lenge of choosing an econometric technique in the context of dynamic
panel data estimation, and note the bias, yet greater precision, of ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimators, as opposed to general least squares or instrumental vari-
able regressions. Studies indicate that the bias induced by ﬁxed eﬀects is
oﬀset when the time variable exceeds thirty observations. Our time series is
twenty-four years, and we proceed.18
7.6 Results and Discussion
This section discusses the ﬁndings of the econometric exercise. We wish
to compare estimated coeﬃcients constrained over the whole panel versus
unconstrained over several diﬀerent dimensions: commodity decomposi-
tion; GDP versus alternative activity variables; and industrial versus de-
veloping countries.
7.6.1 Benchmark Regression and Matched Expenditure versus GDP
For the ﬁrst comparison to previous research, we use the thirty-one-
country and four-commodity whole panel with country- and commodity-
ﬁxed eﬀects to run a benchmark regression for U.S. imports and U.S. ex-
ports. An F-test of the constrained whole panel against the unconstrained
country- and commodity-ﬁxed eﬀects panel rejects the null hypothesis that
the constrained and unconstrained regressions are the same. Table 7.3
presents short-run and long-run estimates for the elasticity estimates for
income and for relative prices from representative previous work. Wald
tests (see note to table 7.3) test the null hypothesis that the short-run and
the long-run coeﬃcients are the same. Generally, the null is rejected for the
activity variable. For relative prices, the null is rejected for exports but not
for imports.
The ﬁrst question is how our elasticities estimated using our thirty-one-
country and four-commodity panel and using GDP as the measure of eco-
nomic activity compare with previous research. Our income elasticities for
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18. Ideally, one might try to estimate this panel using a vector error correction model
(VECM) suited for dynamic panel data estimation—these techniques go beyond the scope of
this paper (see, for example, Beck [2001]; Schich and Pelgrin [2002]; and Smith [2000] for es-
timation of long and wide panels). In future work, it makes sense to try to generate the coin-
tegrating vector explicitly using panel dynamic ordinary least squares (Mark and Sul 2002;
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.both exports and imports are higher in the short run but are similar to the
long-run estimates that come from regressions run over sample periods
starting from the 1980s, such as Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998). Our price
elasticities are generally lower than comparable studies, particularly on the
export side and often are not signiﬁcant. This may be a result of the con-
struction of our relative price index using the GDP deﬂator for all the cat-
egories of trade. (Note that this is not the deﬂator we construct for subse-
quent regressions, where we instead use matched trade price and deﬂators.)
Changing from the workhorse model speciﬁcation to matched expendi-
ture as the measure of economic activity and matched prices makes a large
diﬀerence to the estimated income elasticities. Both the short-run and
long-run elasticities are much lower (with the short-run coeﬃcients almost
too low) and the long-run coeﬃcients close to the theoretical priors based
on constant share of trade in expenditure of about 1.0. This suggests that
the GDP variable may not be the correct measure of economic activity that
drives trade ﬂows.
With respect to relative prices, although the regressions with matched
expenditure also incorporate greater richness with regard to the relative
prices (as discussed in the data section), the signiﬁcance level of relative
prices does not improve in this panel speciﬁcation of the four-commodity
model.
Finally, and to be further discussed in the following, we ﬁnd that the va-
riety variable is statistically signiﬁcant in the regressions for imports and
exports implemented with matched expenditure and matched prices but
not for the export regression using GDP as the measure of activity and the
GDP deﬂators in the measure of relative prices.
In sum, a key ﬁnding is that although the Houthakker-Magee asymme-
try (in estimated elasticity of trade with respect to measures of economic
activity) persists both in the short and long run, the magnitude of the
asymmetry is dramatically smaller than with the benchmark speciﬁcation
of the workhorse model. Matched expenditure, matched prices, and vari-
ety appear to play a key role in reducing the asymmetry of estimated elas-
ticities of trade with respect to economic activity.
7.6.2 Disaggregating by Product Categories
Given that the commodity-by-country composition of trade has
changed, in some cases dramatically, do the coeﬃcients on economic ac-
tivity, relative prices, and variety vary across product categories? Table 7.4
presents regressions by commodity group with country-ﬁxed eﬀects. An F-
test of the constrained whole panel with country-ﬁxed eﬀects versus the un-
constrained panel with country-ﬁxed eﬀects rejects the null hypothesis that
the constrained and unconstrained regressions are the same. Wald tests in
general reject the null hypothesis that the short-run and long-run coeﬃ-
cients are the same on the matched expenditure variable but do not reject




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the null hypothesis that the short-run and long-run relative price coeﬃ-
cients are the same (excepting that the null is rejected at the 5 percent level
for auto exports).
Comparing the elasticities on matched expenditure and variety across
the commodity panels: for exports, the long-run elasticities of autos, capi-
tal goods, and consumer goods are greater than the short-run elasticities,
as expected. For imports, diﬀerences in estimated expenditure elasticities
are substantial across the disaggregated commodities groups. Comparing
the short-run and the long-run estimates, the short-run cyclical respon-
siveness of trade with respect to matched economic activity exceeds the
long-run responsiveness for U.S. imports of consumer goods and autos
and auto parts, but this is not in evidence for capital goods. The situation
of short-run exceeding long-run elasticities is consistent with the oft-
discussed unsustainability of the trajectory of the U.S. trade deﬁcit (Mann
2005). Whereas most of the estimates make sense and are of plausible mag-
nitudes, those for autos seem unreasonable, particularly the short-run es-
timate. Based on this analysis that disaggregation of product categories is
statistically relevant for understanding the drivers of trade ﬂows, our fu-
ture program of work will allow the countries included in each product cat-
egory to vary as we will no longer require the uniform panel.
7.6.3 Disaggregating Industrial and Developing Countries 
by Product Group
Not only has the commodity composition of trade changed but there has
also been a signiﬁcant change, particularly evident for imports, in the
composition of U.S. trade with the industrial versus developing coun-
tries. Moreover, apropos our implementation using matched expenditure
and trade prices, exchange rate regimes and sources of economic growth
may diﬀer between industrial and developing countries. Are diﬀerencesob-
served in the estimated activity and relative price coeﬃcients between in-
dustrial and developing countries and across product groups? (tables 7.5
and 7.6). F-tests of regressions including country-ﬁxed eﬀects reject the
null hypotheses that the industrial and developing countries regressions
are the same for each of the four product groups. Wald tests of the null hy-
pothesis that short-run and long-run coeﬃcients are the same are as noted.
The following summarizes key aspects of the tables:
• With respect to relative prices: The relative price coeﬃcient is of the
correct sign and signiﬁcant for imports of consumer goods and capi-
tal goods from industrial countries; it is signiﬁcant and of the correct
sign for all product categories of exports. This is in contrast to the es-
timates that constrained the relative price coeﬃcient to be the same for
industrial and developing countries and that resulted in poorly esti-
mated coeﬃcients.
Understanding the U.S. Trade Deﬁcit: A Disaggregated Perspective 265Table 7.5 Import regressions using a dummy variable for industrial trading partner with
country-ﬁxed eﬀects
Matched expenditure Relative price
Variety 
Level  of  Industrial Developing Industrial Developing  categories, 
disaggregation country country country country 1980–2003
Capital goods 1.29∗∗ (SR) –0.24∗ (SR) –0.31 (SR) –0.20 (SR)
0.78∗∗ (LR) 3.12∗∗ (LR) –0.71∗∗ (LR) 5.01∗∗ (LR) 1.42∗∗
3.52a (SR) 4.156∗∗ (SR) –1.35∗∗ (SR) 0.86∗∗∗ (SR)
Consumer goods 1.32a (LR) 1.96∗∗ (SR) –4.34∗∗ (LR) 14.34∗∗ (SR) –0.19
8.16∗∗ (SR) 9.72∗∗∗ (SR) 0.72 (SR) 2.26∗ (SR)
Autos and parts 1.59∗∗ (LR) 3.53∗∗ (LR) –1.71 (LR) 6.88 (LR) 0.32
1.52∗∗ (SR) 0.97∗∗ (SR) –0.29 (SR) 0.16 (SR)
ISM-ex 0.26 (LR) 1.47∗∗ (LR) 1.97 (LR) 0.86 (LR) 0.17
Notes: SR   short run; LR   long run. Wald Test: Null hypothesis that LR and SR are the same. Cap-
ital goods—Expenditure for both groups rejects the null. Consumer goods—Relative price for both
groups rejects the null. Autos—Expenditure for developing countries rejects the null. Industrial supplies
and materials, excluding oil (ISM-ex)—Expenditure for developing countries rejects the null and for in-
dustrial country at the 10 percent level.
aDummy for industrial countries is not signiﬁcant.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 7.6 Export regressions using a dummy variable for industrial trading partner with
country-ﬁxed eﬀects
Matched expenditure Relative price
Variety 
Level  of  Industrial Developing Industrial Developing  categories, 
disaggregation country country country country 1980–2003
Capital goods 0.67∗ (SR) 0.79∗∗ (SR) –0.38∗∗ (SR) –0.014 (SR)
0.70∗∗∗ (LR) 0.94∗∗ (LR) 0.12 (LR) 0.013 (LR) 5.2∗∗
0.45∗∗ (SR) 0.69∗∗ (SR) –0.45∗∗ (SR) 0.014 (SR)
Consumer goods 1.09∗∗ (LR) 1.64∗∗ (SR) –0.58∗ (LR) 0.022 (LR) –0.12
1.19∗∗∗ (SR) 1.41∗∗ (SR) –0.922∗∗ (SR) 0.043 (SR)
Autos and parts 0.66∗∗∗ (LR) 1.22∗∗ (LR) –1.55∗∗ (LR) –0.19 (LR) 0.79
0.32a (SR) 0.37∗∗ (SR) –0.02 (SR) 0.01 (SR)
ISM-ex 0.81∗∗ (LR) 1.46∗∗ (LR) –1.18∗∗ (LR) –0.26 (LR) –0.46
Notes: SR   short run; LR   long run. Wald Test: Null hypothesis that SR and LR are the same. Cap-
ital goods—Expenditure for developing countries rejects the null. Consumer goods—Expenditure for
developing countries reject (1 percent level); expenditure industrial countries reject (5 percent level); rel-
ative prices industrial countries reject (1 percent level). Autos—Expenditure for developing countries
and relative prices for industrial countries reject the null. Industrial supplies and materials, excluding oil
(ISM-ex)—Expenditure for both groups reject; relative prices for industrial countries reject (5 percent
level).
aDummy for industrial countries is not signiﬁcant.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.• With respect to activity:The elasticity for U.S. capital goods exports to
industrial countries does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from that to develop-
ing countries, but U.S. capital goods imports from industrial countries
is more responsive in the short run and less responsive in the long run
to U.S. activity than imports from developing countries. The U.S. con-
sumer goods exports to industrial countries respond diﬀerently to for-
eign activity in those high-income countries as compared with the
response to activity in the developing countries. On the other hand,
there is no diﬀerence in elasticity of U.S. consumer goods imports with
respect to source country.
What does all this add up to in the context of the recent evolution of the
U.S. trade deﬁcit? First, with respect to capital goods imports and exports,
changing relative prices in industrial countries, and net trade, these coeﬃ-
cients are consistent with a story that dollar appreciation has, ceteris
paribus, dampened capital goods exports and encouraged capital goods
imports from the industrial countries. The depreciation of the dollar
against these same currencies since 2002, and the somewhat higher pass-
through of that exchange rate change vis-à-vis at least the euro19 may, ce-
teris paribus, change the trajectory of the trade deﬁcit in capital goods
(presented in ﬁgure 7.1). But, to the extent that an increasing share of these
goods come from developing economies, any dollar depreciation may have
less of an eﬀect to reduce capital goods imports or expand capital goods
exports to developing countries, given the lack of signiﬁcance in the esti-
mated coeﬃcient for relative prices of capital goods for developing coun-
tries.20
Second, with respect to changing investment activity, these coeﬃcients
are consistent with a story that robust U.S. investment demand has en-
couraged imports of capital goods with a relatively higher elasticity,
whereas slower investment growth abroad (both in the industrial and the
developing world) has tended to yield slower growth in capital goods ex-
ports.
Third, the fact that the variety eﬀect is smaller for imports than for ex-
ports suggests that variety importantly underpins U.S. capital goods ex-
port growth, which is consistent with Schott (2004). Put together, the dete-
rioration of net trade in capital goods comes from relatively more robust
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19. The U.S. import prices from the European Union have risen about 14 percent since the
peak of the dollar in February 2002. This represents more than a 25 percent pass-through of
the euro appreciation into U.S. import prices. Import prices from Japan, on the other hand,
have stayed stable since early 2002, in spite of a more than 25 percent appreciation of the yen
against the dollar (Bureau of Labor Statistics)—while this limited pass-through is no doubt
due in part to deﬂation in Japan that cannot be the only story.
20. The large positive and signiﬁcant long-run coeﬃcient for relative price of capital goods
imports from developing countries suggests another missing variable or that the variety vari-
able needs additional work.U.S. investment with a relatively higher elasticity, a dollar appreciation
particularly against the industrial countries where relative prices are esti-
mated signiﬁcantly, and signiﬁcant increases in global supply-cum-variety.
For consumer goods,the story is somewhat diﬀerent not only because the
estimated U.S. consumer demand elasticity is so high in the short-run but
also because relative prices are signiﬁcant and rather high for products
from the industrial countries. First, with respect to changing relative prices
in industrial countries and net trade in consumer goods, these coeﬃcients
are consistent with a story that dollar appreciation has, ceteris paribus,
hurt consumer goods exports to industrial countries and, particularly
given the higher relative price elasticity, encouraged consumer goods im-
ports from industrial countries. The depreciation of the dollar against
these same currencies since 2002, and the somewhat higher pass-through
of that exchange rate change vis-à-vis at least the euro may, ceteris paribus,
reduce the net trade deﬁcit in consumer goods (presented in ﬁgure 7.1).
But, to the extent that an increasing share of consumer goods come from
developing economies, any dollar depreciation may have less of an eﬀect to
reduce consumer goods imports, given the poorly estimated coeﬃcient for
relative prices of consumer goods from developing countries.21
Second, with respect to consumer demand growth, variety, and net trade,
the coeﬃcients are consistent with a story that relatively more robust U.S.
consumer demand along with a very high short-run cyclical demand elas-
ticity has encouraged imports of consumer goods and autos from all trad-
ing partners well in excess of the foreign demand for U.S. exports of con-
sumer goods. Surprisingly, global supply-cum-variety does not appear to
be a relevant determinant of trade in consumer goods. Put together, the
deterioration of net trade in consumer goods comes from relatively strong
U.S. consumer demand growth with a relatively higher short-run elasticity,
as well as dollar appreciation (with greater imports of luxury, price-
sensitive goods from industrial countries, and reduced exports of similarly
price-sensitive goods to industrial countries).
7.6.4 Summary of Findings
The paper prepared new estimates of the elasticity of U.S. trade ﬂows us-
ing bilateral trade data for thirty-one countries, using diﬀerent measures of
expenditure and including alternative measures of global supply and vari-
ety. We examine four categories of goods based on the BEA’s end-use clas-
siﬁcation system—autos, ISM-ex, consumer goods, and capital goods. We
consider whether industrial and developing countries diﬀer in their elas-
ticities.
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21. The large positive and signiﬁcant long-run coeﬃcient for relative price of consumer
goods imports from developing countries suggests another missing variable or that the vari-
ety variable needs additional work.1. Using expenditure matched to commodity group rather than GDP as
the measure of income signiﬁcantly reduces the Houthakker-Magee asym-
metry in the long-run estimates and yields far more plausible values for
these income elasticities.
2. Short-run estimates of U.S. consumer goods imports with respect to
matched economic activity exhibit very high cyclical elasticity, which is
consistent with the unsustainability of the trajectory of the trade deﬁcit.
3. The four product categories behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerently from an
aggregated panel.
4. Global supply-cum-variety is a signiﬁcant variable, particularly for
capital goods.
5. Industrial and developing countries have diﬀerent income and rela-
tive price elasticities for these four product groups. In particular, when in-
dustrial countries are distinguished from developing countries, the esti-
mated coeﬃcients for relative prices for industrial countries are the correct
sign, signiﬁcant, and of plausible values.
6. We also investigated whether U.S.-China trade is signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent than industrial country or developing country trade. The results are
not conclusive.22
7.7 Implications and Direction for Further Work
7.7.1 Do Changing Trade Shares Change Trade Elasticities?
The results indicate that industrial and developing countries diﬀer in
their elasticities of economic activity and relative price. The shares of these
two groups in trade have changed over time, in particular within product
categories for imports. When elasticities for economic activity from the re-
gression that splits the panel into four product categories and allows the
elasticities to vary across the industrial and developing countries (tables
7.5 and 7.6) are reaggregated using the annual trade weights of these two
groups and for the four product categories in U.S. trade, we conclude that
the long-run expenditure elasticity of U.S. imports rises from 1980 to 2003.
These results imply that the assumption of a constant elasticity of U.S. im-
ports with respect to U.S. economic activity may have to be rejected and
that projections of U.S. imports based on the constant elasticity assump-
tion may be ﬂawed. No similar trend is apparent for the expenditure elas-
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22. For a number of reasons, we might expect China to be diﬀerent from other countries in
this speciﬁcation of U.S. dynamic trade. China’s trade shares changed the most. Its net trade
deﬁcit is on the steepest trajectory. Its variety increased the most. Its exchange rates have
changed the least. Table 6 in Mann and Plück (2005) reports regression results investigating
whether China is appreciably diﬀerent from the rest of the world in the consumer goods and
capital goods categories. The bottom line is that the picture is mixed in terms of short-run ver-
sus long-run eﬀects. The very large long-run estimates on U.S. economic activity are consis-
tent with the graphical evidence but arguably could not persist.270 Catherine L. Mann and Katharina Plück
Table 7.7 Summary of in-sample predictive performance (billions of U.S. dollars)
Matched expenditure,  GDP as income and 
variety, and industrial  aggregate trade ﬂows 
country dummies (from table 7.3)
Total error, 1998–2003 Imports Exports Imports Exports
Using whole-panel estimates 386 134 198 234
Using good-speciﬁc elasticities
Consumer goods 172.99 0.89 20.43 23.27
Capital goods –73.16 110.50 –0.15 124.83
Autos 273.2 28.99 97.91 42.04
Industrial supplies and materials, 
excluding oil 12.94 –6.69 106.52 20.41
ticity for exports, which is consistent with the observation that country
shares have changed less.23
7.7.2 Do These New Elasticities Predict Better?
Research using the workhorse model often addresses the tension between
the theoretical plausibility of the estimated elasticities, speciﬁcally the
Houthakker-Magee asymmetry, and the aﬃrmed excellence of these simple
equations to predict U.S. exports and imports in the short and medium
terms. By using matched expenditure and trade prices and by disaggregat-
ing product groups and industrial versus developing countries, we reduce
the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry, but do we “do better” at prediction?
We examine this question by comparing in-sample predictive performance
of two alternative models, estimating the models from 1980 to 1997, and then
running the model forward from 1998 to 2003 using the short-run and long-
run estimated coeﬃcients for matched expenditure and relative prices and the
actual values from the right-hand-side variables. We compare the actual with
the predicted values in each year and sum the diﬀerence as the total error
(table 7.7). The horse race is between the benchmark model that uses GDP
and aggregated trade (from table 7.3)—a formulation that many forecasters
would use because they are interested in aggregate exports and imports; and
the matched expenditure model, with variety, with four separate product
groups, and with industrial country dummies (from tables 7.5 and 7.6).
The bottom line in terms of predicted performance is the sum of the in-
sample predictive errors. For total exports, our country-commodity disag-
gregated estimates better predict exports compared with the simple model.
For total imports, even though we obtain more plausible values for the long-
run elasticities, our predictions are poor compared with the benchmark
model that uses U.S. GDP as the measure of expenditure because the short-
23. See discussion and presentation of the data, particularly ﬁgure 3 in Mann and Plück
(2005).run elasticities are so high, particularly for consumer goods and autos. Our
results address the ﬁnding that surprised Houthakker and Magee (1969) in
their original study: the very low income elasticities for U.S. exports. Our es-
timations suggest that these elasticities might in fact be closer to those of
other industrial countries. But we have more work to do on the import side
to estimate elasticities that meet theoretical norms and also predict well.
Does our matched expenditure model do equally well (or poorly) in the
four commodity groups? We examined each of the four product groups
comparing the model results for the matched expenditure, variety, and
industrial-country dummies with the simple model that uses GDP as the
driver of trade. (See table 7.7.) Within product groups, auto trade and con-
sumer goods imports are particularly poorly explained in-sample by the
new disaggregated model. But all the export categories are better predicted
in-sample by the matched expenditure and variety model than when GDP
is used as the measure of economic activity. Hence, future work should fo-
cus on narrowing the country group for autos and reestimating the equation
for consumer goods, including augmenting the drivers of economic activity
(beyond personal consumption expenditures to add a wealth variable for
example) and recalculating the variety variable with more detailed data.
7.7.3 “What If” U.S. Spending Slows and Foreign Spending Booms?
In recent policymaker confabs such as the G8, it has been common to
call for increased U.S. savings and greater foreign growth as well as more
ﬂexibility in exchange rate regimes.24Suppose the United States saves more
and growth abroad increases over the next several years to 2007 [2006?]?
How much would the U.S. trade deﬁcit be diﬀerent from a scenario where
growth is as projected by Consensus Economics Forecasts, a well-known
economic forecasting group?
The assumptions for real consumption and investment growth for our
sample of countries from Consensus Economics Forecasts and our estimated
elasticities are the starting points for illustrative scenarios for how U.S. trade
deﬁcit adjustment might take place for 2007 [2006?] (ﬁgure 7.3 and table 
7.8). Given the estimated short-run and long-run elasticities, the Consensus
Economics Forecasts, and no change in the exchange value of the dollar (from
mid-2005), the real nonoil trade deﬁcit in 2006 would be about $725 billion.
A rest-of-world investment boom and a rest-of-world consumption
boom (as quantiﬁed in table 7.8, where boom is deﬁned as the average high
value for consumption or investment growth over the 1980 to 2003 period)
yield some narrowing of the U.S. trade deﬁcit. But because most of our
capital goods exports go to mature industrial markets, whose average
booms are modest, and because the short-run and long-run elasticities for
exports are relatively low, our capital goods exports do not increase that
much. And because the share of consumption goods in U.S. exports is rel-
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24. This section draws on Mann (2006).Fig. 7.3 Projected real trade deﬁcit (ex. Oil), using commodity-speciﬁc elasticity
estimates, billions of U.S. dollars
Source:Authors’ calculations using regression estimates and forecasts for country investment
and personal consumption expenditure from Consensus Economics Forecasts, August 2005
(http://www.consensusforecasts.com); Macroadvisers’ Economic Outlook; United Nations
Comtrade database; Macroadvisers forecast for real X and M growth are generated from
macroadviser’s forecast from June 22, 2005 (volume 23, number 5).
atively small, booming consumption abroad does little to improve the
trade account. Overall, global consumption and investment booms do not
play a very large role in narrowing the trade deﬁcit in the short term be-
cause the geographical and commodity patterns of trade on the export side
have been remarkably stable for twenty-ﬁve years. Over the longer term,
however, as the long-term elasticities for exports are larger than the short-
run elasticities, sustained foreign growth could have a larger impact on the
trajectory of the U.S. trade deﬁcit.
In contrast, investment and consumption slowdowns in the United States
(compared to historical cycles from the 1980 to 2003 period) would yield a
quick stabilizing of the real trade deﬁcit. This is because consumption goods
and autos are a large share of imports, and both have high estimated short-run
elasticity of demand. The consumption slow-down assumed for the United
States is modest by historical standards of the last twenty-ﬁve years but, nev-
ertheless, is outside recent experience and therefore likely to be painful.25
What about a role for the exchange value of the dollar? Based on our es-
timates, the exchange rate plays an important role in expenditure switching
for trade with industrial countries, but has little empirical signiﬁcance for
25. See also Truman (2005) for a similar conclusion.exports to or imports from developing countries, for which real exchange
rates have moved relatively little.
Our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Freund and Warnock
(chap. 4 in this volume), and Faruqee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti (chap. 10
in this volume). Freund and Warnock conclude that adjustments to con-
sumption-driven current account deﬁcits require signiﬁcantly steeper ex-
change rate depreciation and thus more pain than adjustments to trade
deﬁcits that have ﬁnanced private investment. Faruqee et al. determine that
a loss of foreign appetite for U.S. assets (reﬂected in a dollar depreciation)
and a consolidation of the U.S. ﬁscal position have a much larger impact
on the current account deﬁcit than do structural reforms in Japan and Eu-
rope. To the extent that a consolidation in the U.S. ﬁscal position took
place via a sun-setting of the income tax cuts, then ﬁscal consolidation and
demand for consumer goods imports would be more clearly linked.
On the other hand, our ﬁndings that the relative price elasticities are sig-
niﬁcant, but not large, and are limited to industrial countries, implies a
challenge to the mechanism for adjustment emphasized in Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (chap. 9 in this volume). Their mechanism for adjustment depends
on the relative price signal shifting resources between traded and non-
traded sectors. Our relative price signal appears to play a more modest role
in directing trade ﬂows.
7.7.4 Conclusions and Further Work
These new elasticities yield insights into the sources of the widening of
the U.S. trade deﬁcit and help to understand the nature of global competi-
tion and how it is impacting broad sectors of the U.S. economy.
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Table 7.8 Assumptions for growth scenarios in ﬁgure 7.3
Average for “boom” in ROW/
Consensus forecasts (real  Add percentage  “realistic slowdown” for the U.S. 
growth, percentage points) 2005 2006 points to achieve: (based on 1980–2003 data)
Gross ﬁxed capital formation
Europe and Japan 3.5 3.7 5.0 8.4
Other industrial countries 7.4 7.2 7.0 14.8
Developing countries 9.2 7.5 1.0 9.9
United States 8.8 7.5 –13.0 –6.0
Personal consumption expenditures
Europe and Japan 1.3 1.7 7.0 8.3
Other industrial countries 3.1 3.1 5.0 8.3
Developing countries 4.9 4.4 11.0 15.2
United States 3.5 3.1 –3.0 0
Source: Authors’ calculations using regression estimates and forecasts for country investment and
personal consumption expenditure from Consensus Economics Forecasts, August 2005 (http://www
.consensusforecasts.com).
Note: ROW   Rest of the world.The diﬀerences in demand elasticities for consumer goods versus for
other product categories—with consumer goods more responsive to con-
sumption patterns in the United States—yields insights into how robust
U.S. consumer demand through trending lower household saving rates, as
augmented by higher stock-market valuation in the 1990s and residential
housing values and tax cuts in the 2000s, contributes to widening the con-
sumer goods share of the trade deﬁcit.
The diﬀerences in relative price elasticities between the industrial and
developing countries—with relative prices signiﬁcant and of correct sign
for industrial countries but not for developing countries—yields insights
into how certain exchange rate regimes, pricing-to-market behavior, or
other factors more prevalent to developing country exporters mute the
price signal, which is consistent with recent work on disaggregate pass-
through (Campa and Goldberg 2004; Marazzi et al. 2005).
The evidence from this analysis suggests that the matched-expenditure
model for exports, disaggregated across commodity groups and income
class (industrial versus developing), is worth continued investigation. Not
only do the elasticities have more plausible values, particularly in the long-
run, but also the equation performs better in-sample than the benchmark
model for exports. Simultaneous speciﬁcation with an equation for relative
prices warrants consideration.
For imports, the matched-expenditure disaggregated model yields more
plausible values for trade elasticities in the long run. However, the in-
sample predictive performance is much worse than for the benchmark
model because the short-run elasticities are very high. To understand the
factors underpinning robust U.S. imports of consumer goods and autos, in
particular, requires additional work. Future work will focus on narrowing
the country set for trade in autos and investigating a more detailed variable
for variety for consumer goods as well as incorporating a wealth variable
into the consumption goods equation.
Going forward, these new elasticities have implications for demand
management and exchange rate policies. In particular, slack U.S. exports
appear importantly related to slack consumption and investment abroad
and low long-term growth prospects in the major markets for U.S. exports,
which have been masked by measures of GDP that incorporate net exports
to the United States. On the other hand, factors beyond strong U.S. con-
sumer demand or love of variety are bolstering U.S. imports of consumer
goods. Diﬀerent relative price elasticities between the industrial and devel-
oping countries suggest long-run implications for U.S. trade of certain ex-
change rate regimes. Exchange rate regimes that limit the transmission of
relative price signals appear to have been important in the past. A change
in these regimes will be an important part of the change in the trajectory of
the U.S. trade deﬁcit going forward.
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Comment Peter B. Kenen
I begin with thanks to the organizer of this conference and the authors of
this paper—thanks to the organizer for the compliment implied by asking
me to comment on a technically sophisticated paper, and thanks to the au-
thors for a meticulous eﬀort to answer some rather important questions.
There is a strong conceptual case for disaggregating trade ﬂows, espe-
cially for the United States, which trades with many countries and in many
goods. Otherwise, estimates of income and price elasticities may be badly
biased by changes in the country and commodity composition of U.S.
trade. I am not sure, however, that the paper by Mann and Plück deals de-
cisively with that need. They do disaggregate by commodity group, which
allows them to ask whether it is better to use diﬀerent measures of eco-
nomic activity for diﬀerent commodity groups rather than follow the com-
mon practice of using GDP for each and every group. They also distinguish
between U.S. trade with industrial countries and with developing coun-
tries. Nevertheless, their strategy and ﬁndings raise several questions.
The ﬁrst question pertains to the treatment of industrial materials.
Shouldn’t the demand for those goods be more responsive to changes in in-
dustrial production than to changes in investment? Use of the two GDP
components, consumption and investment, as explanatory variables is ap-
pealing; they are mutually exclusive categories, whereas industrial produc-
tion may be destined for consumption or investment. Furthermore, their
use of the two GDP components helps them to compare the trade-balance
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fessor of Economics and International Finance Emeritus at Princeton University.eﬀect of a change in household consumption with the trade-balance eﬀect
of a change in business investment. Yet that comparison may be badly
ﬂawed insofar as trade in industrial materials truly reﬂects the joint eﬀects
of household and business demand for ﬁnal products that embody large
amounts of industrial materials. I wonder, moreover, whether the use of in-
vestment as the expenditure variable in the trade equations for industrial
materials accounts for one of the striking results shown in table 7.4 of the
paper; this is the only case in which the expenditure coeﬃcient in the long-
run demand equation for U.S. exports exceeds the expenditure coeﬃcient
in the long-run demand equation for U.S. imports.
The second question pertains to the pooling of time series and country
data, which constrains the price and income elasticities to be the same for
the thirty-one countries in their sample. To what extent does this blur the
eﬀects of changes in the country composition of U.S. foreign trade? In
tables 7.5 and 7.6 of their paper, Mann and Plück present results for two
groups of countries—industrial and developing countries. In a previous
version of their paper, moreover, they presented separate results for U.S.
trade with China.1It might be useful, however, to derive separate equations
for some other countries, especially Canada and Mexico, given their very
large trade with the United States, and to compare the resulting equations
with those for other countries or country groups. Disaggregation by coun-
try or country group would be especially helpful when, as in the ﬁnal part
of the paper, Mann and Plück discuss the likely eﬀects of various changes
in economic conditions at home and abroad, including changes in ex-
change rates. Disaggregation by country or country group would be more
useful for this purpose than disaggregation by commodity group.
The third question pertains to the eﬀects of omitting completely trade in
oil and food. Mann and Plück had to do that, for reasons explained in their
paper. But they should perhaps have warned their readers that the exclu-
sion of oil and food may impair the comparability of their regression re-
sults with those obtained by other studies. Could it perhaps help to explain
why their results diﬀer appreciably from those of the other three studies
shown in table 7.3—why in particular they succeed in narrowing the
Houthakker-Magee asymmetry, a matter to which I return in the follow-
ing.
Thus far, I have focused on what Mann and Plück did. Let me turn now
to some of the things they say, especially their quasi-normative use of the
Houthakker-Magee asymmetry—the fact that, in most studies, as well as
in most of their own trade equations, the income elasticity of the U.S. de-
mand for imports exceeds the income elasticity of the foreign demand for
U.S. exports. Citing Krugman and Baldwin (1987), they say that this ﬁnd-
ing is incompatible with a global long-run equilibrium:
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1. See also footnote 22 to the present version.The estimates imply that if the United States and the rest of the world
grow at the same pace (long-run convergence), the U.S. trade deﬁcit
would worsen, absent a trend change in relative price—which is also in-
consistent with long-run equilibrium.
The Houthakker-Magee asymmetry is, as they say, manifestly inconsistent
with the long-run convergence of real incomes at constant relative prices.
But a trend change in relative prices, while inconsistent with long-run con-
vergence, is not inconsistent with long-run equilibrium. Recall the models
developed by Harry Johnson and others many years ago, in which equal
rates of growth in output, due either to capital accumulation or technical
progress, can lead to continuing changes in relative prices (i.e., the terms of
trade).2 It may therefore be wrong to dismiss a robust empirical ﬁnding
merely because it is inconsistent with uniform global growth at constant
relative prices. A world displaying that property would be pretty indeed,
but we should not be dismayed by a world that does not display it. Yet
Mann and Plück, while not dismayed, tend too much to use the reduction
of the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry as a normative criterion—to prefer
empirical results in which it is smaller.
My chief concern, however, derives not from the author’s treatment of
the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry but from their results regarding the
price elasticities of demand for U.S. exports and imports. The conventional
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Fig. 7C.1 The trade balance to GDP ratio and the real dollar exchange rate,
lagged two years
Source: Chinn (2005, 11). Reprinted with permission.wisdom holds that a reduction of the U.S. current-account deﬁcit requires
a combination of expenditure changes and expenditure switching and that
the latter can be achieved by dollar depreciation, which should have two
eﬀects—switching U.S. expenditure from traded to nontraded goods, and
switching U.S. and foreign expenditure between U.S. tradables and foreign
tradables. Mann and Plück express concern about the implications of their
ﬁndings for the eﬃcacy of the ﬁrst type of switching, but I am more con-
cerned about the implications for the second type.
Consider the price elasticities shown in table 7.3 of their paper. They are,
without exception, lower than the ones obtained by the earlier studies
listed in that table. The long-run price elasticities are much larger for U.S.
imports of consumer goods, as shown in table 7.5 and likewise larger for
U.S. imports of autos and parts (although the regression coeﬃcient falls
short of signiﬁcance). But it is wrong-signed for industrial materials. And
all of the price elasticities for U.S. imports from the developing countries
are wrong-signed, while those for U.S. exports to developing countries in
table 7.5 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
I ﬁnd it quite hard to square these results with the story told by ﬁgure
7C.1, which plots the U.S. trade balance relative to GDP along with the log
of the U.S. real exchange lagged two years. How can these series be so
closely correlated if the relevant price elasticities are as low as those in
Mann and Plück’s paper?
Finally, a policy question: given the large diﬀerence between the com-
puted price elasticities for U.S. trade with industrial countries and those for
U.S. trade with developing countries, are we perhaps expecting too much
from any future appreciation of the Asian currencies? Papers elsewhere in
this volume give good reasons for believing that the renminbi and other
Asian currencies are undervalued; the huge accumulation of foreign-
exchange reserves is itself indicative. But Mann and Plück’s paper makes
me wonder how much to expect from a signiﬁcant appreciation of the
Asian currencies and thus to repeat my previous suggestion that the au-
thors look more closely at smaller country groups.
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